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NATURAL LAW NORMSt
BRENDAN F. BROWN*
B OTH THE NATURAL and the supernatural laws provide norms of
morality, namely, fundamental standards or criteria by which to
distinguish right from wrong. This paper is concerned with the norms
provided by the natural law as they relate to justice in the moral and
legal orders. It will not deal with charity, or with divine justice under
the supernatural law.
I
The norms in the moral and legal orders find their common basis in
the dictates of the natural law, that part of the eternal law which refers
only to the actions of men. It is known or discovered immediately by
man through unaided reason, though ultimately it proceeds from the
Divine Lawgiver. It conforms to the essence of rational human nature.
It is a source of obligation for men because it has been ordered by the
Creator of nature. It establishes a norm of objective morality, imposing
certain obligations to God, to others, and to sub-rational nature through
obligations owing to one's self.,
The natural law is truly law because it has been promulgated in man's
reason as an ordinance for the common good, by Him who has the care
of all things. It is given content by the reasonable man, following right
reason. Justice and charity are the two chief mutual obligations of hu-
man beings toward each other as imposed by the natural law.
Law and morals are related to each other from the point of view of
the virtue of justice, in its proper and ordinary sense of a cardinal vir-
tue, which perfects the will by inclining it to render to each his own.
The sciences of law and of morals are connected in many ways. Thus,
t To be published in the proceedings for 1962 of the American Catholic Philo-
sophical Association.
* A.B., LL.B., Creighton University; LL.M., J.U.D., Catholic University of
America; D.Phil. in Law, Oxford University, England; Dean of Catholic Uni-
versity of America, 1949-1954. Dr. Brown has been a Professor of Law at
Loyola University, New Orleans, since 1954.
1 Brown, Natural Law: Dynamic Basis of Law and Morals in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 31 TULANE L. REV. 491 (1957).
both have the same subject matter of hu-
man conduct, namely, justice. Both have
authority to direct human conduct to the
objective of justice. Both promote justice
in order to establish friendship and orderly
relations among men in society. Both share
the same end, namely, the preservation of
the moral order by justice, despite differ-
ences in regard to respective functions. 2
But law and morals are distinct sciences
in several respects. Thus, the conscience
of the individual is the chief concern of
morals, but not of law, which is an extrin-
sic social science. The concept of obliga-
tion differs in morals and law. In the moral
sphere, the obligation to render to every
man what is objectively owed to him arises
from an inner realization that there exists a
moral obligation which ought to be dis-
charged. As soon as the moral obligation
is recognized, the will is moved because it
is good and virtuous and inclines toward
the right. Obligation is voluntarily fulfilled
because of the virtue of justice. In morals,
the decision is not coerced by extrinsic
force or pressure. Indeed, a moral deci-
sion in the realm of justice which is coerced
loses its moral worth.
The unique characteristic of law, how-
ever, is that it imposes norms of justice
upon individuals for the sake of the com-
mon good. Law focuses its attention upon
the external act of justice, resulting in the
effects of exterior peace and order which
are the results of the right psychological
attitude of the citizen. Law compels the
meeting of the obligation of justice, if nec-
essary, by appropriate juridical institu-
tions. Law has a power of coercion which
2 SHEEDY, MATERIALS FOR LEGAL ETHICS 14, 15
(1950).
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morals does not have. As Professor Rom-
men has pointed out: "The juridical
character of an act is evidenced by the
perception and recognition that this pos-
sible use of force is not in conflict with
the inner nature of the act in question."3
But the actual use of coercion does not
change the inner nature of the legal act
in question.
Right or justice is distinguishable from
such social virtues as refer to another, such
as friendship, gratitude, liberality, or love
of neighbor, insofar as it is enforced by the
command of the state. Thus the duty of
gratitude is an ethical duty only, because it
is not actionable. Again, there are certain
moral duties to oneself and to God. But
these are not legal duties in the strict sense.
St. Thomas Aquinas was aware of the sim-
ilarities and differences between the moral
and legal orders. Implicit in his writings
are the principles which govern the rela-
tionship of these two orders. This is so
although he was writing primarily as a
moralist and a theologian. 4
Justification for the use of force in com-
pelling justice is to be found in the fact
that justice is necessary for peace and tran-
quility in a community. No community
could long exist without peace. Justice is
the cohesive element in society, in which
man, as a rational and social animal, must
live according to the norms of the natural
law if he is to realize the ends of his na-
ture. But only force will restrain some
in the community from acting unjustly.
Besides, the disciplining influence of force
3 ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN
LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 208
(1948).
'SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 58 (1st American
ed. English Dominican Province transl. 1947).
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produces a good pedagogical effect when
the law is just.
II
Now what is the responsibility of the
civil law to implement the justice of the
moral order? Here civil law will mean hu-
man positive law which has been com-
manded by the political sovereign, i.e., Jus
Civile in its strict sense. It will not signify
the Jus Gentium (law of nations), or even
the Jus Civile in the wide sense of a com-
plete body of national social control, for
that would comprehend natural national
law to the extent that positive law may
have failed to reinforce the primary dic-
tates of the natural law with appropriate
legal sanctions.
The responsibility of the civil law to-
ward the justice of the moral order is lim-
ited to the effectuation only of those min-
imum standards of moral conduct which
are immediately essential for the mainte-
nance and promotion of the common good.
This limitation of responsibility is the result
of the characteristic end of civil law, and
of the restricted availability and effective-
ness of methods of enforcement. It is not
the duty of the civil law to compel the ob-
servance of all obligations of justice as de-
termined by the moral order. It can not
and should not attempt to forbid all injus-
tice.
The minimum standards of justice which
are required for the good of society will
vary from time to time in the light of the
constantly shifting fact patterns of the eco-
nomic, political, cultural and sociological
conditions of a particular community. The
positive law is obliged to look realistically
at the customs of the country, the capacity
of the generality of men therein to meet
moral standards, and the nature of things
in general. But the boundary line between
law and morals should shift in the direc-
tion of an enlarging transformation of the
norms of the moral order into law. This
will occur whenever public opinion deter-
mines that it is necessary for the common
good, and applies political pressure upon
the legislator, in the event that the law-
maker himself has not taken the lead in
bringing about this transformation.
But within the limits described above,
the civil law must apply the universal idea
of justice. 5 The immutable idea of right
must dwell within the body of the positive
law. The vitality of civil law depends,
therefore, upon the extent of its justice.
This in turn depends upon the reasonable-
ness of the law.
Now some of the norms of justice which
are necessary for the preservation of soci-
ety are static, while others are dynamic. The
static norms of justice, such as the precepts
of the Ten Commandments, are immutable,
but the conclusions reached by the ap-
plication of these immutable norms to
changing social facts produce sub-norms,
which are dynamic and mutable. The
positive law is bound substantially to im-
plement the content of both types of norms
by way of conclusion. They bind both
the moralist and the legislator.
In turn, state law has both static and
dynamic norms. Its static norms are such
because they fall within the sphere of nat-
ural morality. They are necessary conclu-
sions of moral principles of justice. Thus
the positive law which forbids and punishes
the injustice of theft or murder is manda-
tory because it is a deduction by reason
5 Leibholz, The Foundations of Justice and Law
in the Light of the Present European Crisis, 212
DUBLIN REv. 44 (1943).
from a primary and necessary conclusion
of the natural law.
But the dynamic norms of the positive
law are reached not by deduction, but
with the aid of induction. The precise con-
tent of these norms is not dictated by the
justice of the moral order. Hence the law-
maker is allowed a certain discretion within
the area of right reason. These dynamic
norms are in the nature of temporary nor-
mative generalizations which the legislator
reaches by induction from a multiplicity of
facts. These generalizations relate to acts
which are morally indifferent in them-
selves, but become normative by the au-
thority of the lawmaker who has acted rea-
sonably in establishing a rule which he re-
gards as necessary for the common good.
Many examples may be given. Thus the
positive law may determine the precise
manner in which the property of an in-
testate will descend, or establish a system
of community property between husband
and wife. Again, the state may render
criminal an act which is morally indifferent
in itself, as when it imposes penalties for
violations of laws which have been passed
against gambling. These mutable norms
are justified as long as they are the result
of reasonable induction from the sociologi-
cal facts in question.
IlI
Civil law is obliged to implement not
only that part of the justice of morals
which is necessary for the common good
by deduction and determination, but it
must also do this in a complete way. The
total implications of justice can be under-
stood only when it is recognized that jus-
tice directs man in his relations with other
men in a twofold sense, namely, as to fel-
low men who are his equals, in the sense
of commutative justice, and as to fellow
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1963
members of a complex, politically-organized
community, in the sense of legal, distribu-
tive, and social justice.
In both the moral and legal orders, there
are two general areas of commutative jus-
tice, namely, assumed or voluntary rela-
tionships, as in the sphere of contracts, and
imposed or natural relationships, as in the
law of torts. In the moral order, injury is
the voluntary and causal violation of the
strict right of another, not simply a mere
infliction of material damage. Both in mor-
als and in law, there may be damage in
fact, without injury, or injury without
damage. But while injury in morals is al-
ways voluntary and intentional, in the sense
of resulting from a morally bad will on the
part of the actor, nevertheless in the legal
order injury may result from negligence, or
thoughtlessness, or may even be imposed
upon a defendant under the doctrine of lia-
bility without fault on the ground of social
justice, which outweighs the moral claim
of the individual to commutative justice.
The legal orders of the civilized communi-
ties of the world, especially the Roman,
Canonical, and Anglo-American legal sys-
tems, have rightly given increasing recog-
nition and enforcement of the moral rights
of the individual in the matter of his per-
sonality and substance. Examples of the
former would include rights of life and
physical integrity, liberty, good name, mar-
riage, worship, education, freedom of ex-
pression and association. Illustrations of
the latter would be the rights of the indi-
vidual to acquire, retain, and dispose of
property, within reason, as a necessary
means for the preservation of his human
dignity.6
6 Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1942, in PAPAL
PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE POLITICAL ORDER 166
(Powers 1952
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Although civil rights belong to men, as
citizens, not as men, so that they come
from the state, and are derived from the
obligation of justice only indirectly, yet
such rights have also been justly expanded
over the centuries. Trial by jury would be
an example. Within recent years, vast im-
provement has taken place in regard to the
removal of restrictions on the exercise of
certain civil rights unjustly restricted.
Not only do rights accrue to the individ-
ual person in consequence of the demands
of justice, but also to the state, as pro-
tector and promoter of the common good.
It has rights of personality and substance
analogous to those of the human person.
Indeed, the state is an artificial person, a
moral person, with a moral life vicariously
derived from the natural persons subject to
its rightful authority. Civil law carries out
a mandate of legal justice when it punishes
treason and unjust attacks against the
rights of the state.
Legal justice sometimes requires a sac-
rifice of an individual good.7 This type of
justice directs men to render to the state
and society their due. But it is to be noted
that there is a reciprocal duty on the part
of the rulers and the ruled." The rulers are
to make just laws and to administer them
justly. The ruled are to abide by these
just laws. Not only are the rulers or law-
makers bound to obey the just laws which
they make, but the state itself, as an arti-
ficial person, is subject to the obligations
of justice imposed by the natural law, a
basic historical cornerstone of Anglo-
American constitutional law. It is the duty
of the state and those responsible for its
7NEWMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE: A His-
TORICO-CRITICA. STUDY IN THOMISM 3-5 (1954).
'CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA Justice 573 (1910).
acts to play a positive role in the promo-
tion of the common good.
Again, justice in the moral order directs
lawmakers to pass laws which will achieve
a distribution of the benefits and burdens
of social life in accordance with the needs
and merits of the citizens. It is to be noted
that distributive justice relates to the dis-
tribution of public, as distinguished from
private, property. Important legal areas
involving distributive justice are the filling
of public offices, tax laws, and legislation
concerning compulsory military service.
Distributive justice is violated in the politi-
cal process whenever public servants en-
gage in graft and corruption, accept bribes,
or have recourse to political expediency.
Sometimes dishonest acts by public officials
include violations of commutative justice
as well as distributive justice.9
I come now to a controversial area in
the discussion of social justice. My views
in this connection have perhaps been in-
fluenced by the impact of the School of So-
ciological Jurisprudence, so ably developed
in the United States by Roscoe Pound from
European sources, when he was dean of
the Harvard Law School. This is still the
dominant school of jurisprudence in this
country, despite the tremendous advances
made within the past quarter of a century
by the School of Objective Natural Law."0
The core of the Sociological School is its
theory of interests, based on the individual
interest, which is roughly analogous to
the subject matter of our commutative jus-
tice; the public interest of the state, which
corresponds to approximately that area
which we describe as legal justice; and the
9 CONNELL, MORALS IN POLITICS AND PROFES-
SIONS 77-89 (1946).
10 BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER 1-46
(1960).
social interest, which is analogous to the
content of what we should describe as so-
cial justice. The interests of society, as
distinct from the state, are dominant. So-
ciety is regarded as a faceless entity, and
the common good is identified with its in-
terests apart from the moral value of the
individual persons in society.1
To refute this erroneous concept of so-
ciety and of the common good, the School
of Objective Natural Law may do well to
recognize society as a moral person, anal-
ogous to that of the state, which has long
been regarded as such a person. The com-
mon good thus becomes the basic moral
interest of society, but as an artificial per-
son, which exists for the individual person,
and has no rights except insofar as they
advance the dignity of the human person.
Instead of speaking about the common
good of the state under legal justice we
may refer to the common good of society
as a distinct entity. 12 The great social bene-
fits, which have arisen during the current
stage of the socialization of the law, would
be interpreted as the implementation of
social justice, rather than as a vindication
of the social interest.
113 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE §§ 80-99 (1959).
12 But see FERREE, THE ACT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
80-141 (1951).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1963
IV
Justice requires not only that law be di-
rected to its proper end, namely, the com-
mon good, but it must also be made by a
legislator who is competent to make the par-
ticular law. This is a jurisdictional matter.
Besides, law must be administered justly
by just procedural law.
Recourse must sometimes be made to
equity to overcome the limitations of strict
positive law. Legislators in formulating
just laws prospectively are unable to antici-
pate every possible situation. Hence the
judge must have discretion to change a
law intrinsically for example, by interpre-
tation, or to apply the natural law in in-
stances of first impression. If a law is not
for the common good when related to a
certain person or to a particular situation,
it may be decided that the law is not ap-
plicable. A form of equity may enter into
the administration of executive justice
when a pardon is given to a person justly
convicted and sentenced under a just law.
Although unjust law is not binding in
conscience, yet prudence may dictate obe-
dience to certain types of unjust law to
avoid public disturbance or scandal. An
example would be where an unjust law
takes away a person's right to a thing, but
does not order him to do something in-
trinsically wrong.
